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THE TRUST THROWBACK RULES:
THE SOLUTION REMAINS AFTER THE PROBLEM FADES
by
JOHN

R. CUNNINGHAM*

INTRODUCTION

Trusts may accumulate income, rather than distribute it currently to beneficiaries, for a variety of reasons. Although there have always been many legitimate,
non-tax reasons for accumulating trust income, at least a principal reason for many
accumulations has been the income tax savings from having a trust as a separate
taxable entity that could have a portion of its income taxed at lower income tax
brackets rather than the higher brackets of many beneficiaries if distributed.
The trust throwback rules, first enacted in 1954 and modified several times,
attempt to remove the income tax incentives for accumulating trust income by taxing
distributions of accumulations of income in a way that either matched or approximated the consequences if the income had been distributed to the beneficiary in the
year it was earned by the trust. The throwback rules do so through a complicated set
of rules that impose significant recordkeeping and administrative burdens.
The throwback rules were not substantially modified by the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 or subsequent tax legislation. However, the compression of the income tax
brackets for trusts and estates removed most, but not all, of the tax benefits of
accumulating income in trusts. This article will briefly review the history of the
throwback rules and will then show that the small savings still available through trust
accumulations that would result without the operation of the throwback rules do not
justify the continuance of these complicated throwback rules. In fact, the tax savings
through trust accumulations without the throwback rules can be matched even within
the operation of the throwback rules. Finally, this article will show that through a
small rate change that may be forthcoming for other reasons, the potential savings
through the accumulation of income in trusts may be reduced to such a degree that
there can be no real argument against the removal of the throwback rules. In this way,
some simplification can be given to an area of tax law that is badly in need of
attention.
HISTORY OF THE THROWBACK RULES
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are treated as separate taxpaying entities, the same as individuals and corporations,
with respect to income which is held within the trust. However, trusts are treated as
conduits as to the current income distributed to beneficiaries, which is deductible to
the trust and includable as income to the beneficiary.'
Trusts may accumulate income for a variety of non-tax reasons. The
beneficiary may be a minor whose needs are met by parents or who might not be
prepared to handle the income if distributed. The beneficiary may be a spendthrift
adult who would improvidently spend anything distributed; accumulation ensures
that money is held for a rainy day. A trust may exist to provide only for the
emergency needs of one generation with distribution to the succeeding generation,
or perhaps the trust is established for yet unborn beneficiaries.2
Of course, trusts historically have been able also to accumulate income for tax
purposes. The potential use of trusts accumulating income for tax avoidance was
recognized long ago. Franklin Roosevelt was the first president to express concern
about the abuses of accumulation trusts.3
The first throwback rules were enacted in 1954. 4 They were based on the
principle of taxing distributions of accumulated income as if the beneficiary to whom
the distribution was made had received the income in the.year it was earned by the
trust. However, numerous exceptions to the throwback rules greatly limited their
effectiveness. Estates were exempted from their application as were distributions of
accumulated income from certain pre-existing trusts. Exceptions were also provided
for (1) accumulations of income not exceeding $2000, (2) amounts accumulated for
a minor or unborn beneficiary, (3) amounts distributed for "emergency needs," and
(4) the final distribution of a trust if the distribution occurred more than nine years
after the last contribution to the trust.5 The throwback rules did not apply to capital
gains of the trust. Only income accumulated by the trust in the last five years was
subject to the throwback rules.6
Under the original rules, the beneficiary would recompute his actual tax
liability for the prior years in which the accumulated income was earned. The
accumulated income was "thrown back" to these prior years by adding the
accumulation and the tax paid by the trust on the accumulation to the beneficiary's
gross income. The beneficiary's income tax was then recomputed. From this tax was
For a discussion of the general nature of trust taxation, see, STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99th
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986, 1243 (CCH Print, Federal Tax
Reports #19, May 8, 1987); Hirschon, Accumulation Trusts and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 1 REV.
INDIVIDUAL TAX'N 291 (1977).

Cong. 2d Sess.,
2A

good discussion of the kinds of accumulation trusts is found in Colbum, Accumulation trusts: Recent

developments restrict but do not eliminate their benefits, 13 EST. PLAN. 8 (1986).
3 Barnett, Accumulation trusts and the '76 Act-simplification at a Price,7 TAX ADVISOR 654, 658 (1976).
4I.R.C. §§ 665-668 (1954).

5I.R.C. § 665(b) (1954).
§ 666(a) (1954).

6 I.R.C.
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subtracted the original amount of tax owed by the beneficiary and the tax paid on the
accumulation by the trust to arrive at the additional throwback tax that was due. If
this calculation yielded a negative throwback tax, the beneficiary was entitled to a
refund or credit.'
The 1954 throwback system failed to achieve its purpose of curbing incentives
to accumulate income, largely because of the five-year limitation and numerous
exceptions to the tax.' By 1969, the use of accumulation trusts was viewed as an
increasing threat to the progressive tax rate structure for individuals, which was
compounded by the use of multiple trusts, each of which would receive the tax
savings of a separate "run up" of the income tax brackets. 9
As a result, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 brought about some major changes
in the throwback rules. The exclusions and exceptions from the tax were largely
repealed, most notably the exception for income accumulated for a minor. The Act
also made the throwback tax applicable to all capital gains of a trust.10 The five-year
limitation on throwbacks was repealed for future years," and the accounting rules
were changed to provide that the accumulations were deemed first to come from the
earliest prior year in which an accumulation of trust income existed (a"first-in, firstout" rule, rather than the earlier "last-in, last-out" rule).' 2 These changes moved
the throwback tax closer to the goal of taxing the accumulation "in substantially the
same manner as if the income had been distributed to the beneficiary currently as
earned.' 3 However, Congress decided not to add a provision that would have
charged interest on the throwback tax for the period between the accumulation and
4
taxable distribution.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 also changed the way in which the throwback tax
was calculated. Under the prior "exact" method, the accumulated income was
thrown back to the beneficiary's actual year that the income was earned by the trust.
The 1969 Act added an alternative method, known as the "short-cut" method.
Under the short-cut method, the accumulation distributed, plus the deemed distributed taxes on the accumulation, was averaged over the number of years accumulated
in the trust. This average was then added to the beneficiary's income in each of the
three years preceding the distribution. The average increased tax for the three years
was then multiplied by the total number of years over which the accumulation distribution had been averaged.' 5
7 I.R.C. § 667 (1954).
8S.Rep. No. 552, 91st
9

Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1969 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& ADMIN.

NEWS

2027, 2157.

1d.

10 I.R.C.

§§ 665(0, 665(g) (1969).
"I.R.C. § 666 (amended 1969).
2 I.R.C. § 666(a) (1969).
11
S. Rep. No. 552,91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2027,2159.
' 4 H.R. CONF. REP. No.782,91st Cong., Ist
Sass. 2, reprintedin 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2392,

2419.
"5STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess.,
Published
REFORM
AcT by
OFIdeaExchange@UAkron,
1976 159-164 (Comm. 1991
Print 1976).
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The 1969 reforms put much greater strength in the throwback rules, but by
1976 Congress felt the need to ease the rules. In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, there
were once again wide changes to the throwback tax, which form the basic current
throwback system. The operation of the current throwback tax will be discussed in
detail later. The main changes from the 1976 Act were:
16
(1) The general repeal of the throwback tax on capital gains,

(2) the restoration of an exception for income accumulated before a beneficiary reaches the age of 21,17
the throwback tax and
(3) the repeal of the "exact" method of determining
18
modification of the "short-cut" method,
(4) the creation of a special rule for multiple accumulation trusts which
provides that when a beneficiary receives accumulations from more than
two trusts with respect to the same accumulation year, the accumulated
trust income is not increased by the deemed taxes distributed by an
additional trust (more than two) and no credit is allowed for taxes paid
by an additional trust, 9 and
(5) the modification of the rules so that a trust would not be deemed to have
made an accumulation distribution when distributing trust accounting
income, which may exceed the "distributable net income" because of
20
deductible fees charged to the trust corpus.
In place of the repealed throwback tax on capital gains, I.R.C. § 644 was
enacted to tax at the grantor's marginal tax rate any gains realized by a trust when
property with unrealized appreciation is transferred to the trust by a grantor and the
gain is realized by the trust within two years of the transfer.2' Finally, the Act revoked
the credit or refund available to a beneficiary if the throwback calculations resulted
in a negative tax.
The changes resulting from the Tax Reform Act of 1976 were largely viewed
as a great improvement over prior law. 22 Especially praiseworthy was the replace16 I.R.C. § 669 (repealed 1976).
7
1I.R.C. § 665(b)(2) (1976). This exception for minors does not apply if the beneficiary falls within the special
multiple trust rule described infra. If this applies, the minor not only loses the gross-up and credit for tax paid
by the trust on the third or more trust, but also the accumulations on the first two trusts are subject to the

throwback tax.
18 I.R.C. § 667(b) (1976).
'9 I.R.C. § 667(c) (1976).
20I.R.C. § 665(b)(2) (1976).
21I.R.C. § 644 (1986) does not apply to property acquired by a trust from a decedent, a pooled income trust,

a charitable remainder annuity or unitrust, or to property sold after the transferor's death.

22

See, e.g., Hirschon,supra note 1, at 305; Wentworth, Accumulation Trusts: A Step Towards Simplifica-

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/3
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ment of alternate ways of computing the tax (which resulted in many fiduciaries
being compelled to make both calculations to minimize the tax) 23 the resurrection of
the exception for accumulation for minors,24 and the repeal of the capital gains
throwback rule. 25 However, the loss of the credit or refund for negative throwback
taxes was attacked, and the multiple trust rule was heavily criticized as "double
taxation.''26 Practitioners also noted that the adoption of a single "short cut"
method of determining the tax was a loss of theoretical purity. The accumulation distributions were not taxed as if received when earned by the trust, but were calculated
on an "income averaging" approach.27
Since the 1976 modifications, only slight changes have been made to the
throwback rules. The 1978 Act revised the throwback rules with respect to their
application to foreign trusts 28 and limited the use of any alternative minimum tax as
a tax deemed distributed with the accumulation to a beneficiary. 29 The 1984 Tax
Reform Act added current I.R.C. § 643(f), the "multiple trust" rule, whichalthough
not directly a part of the throwback rules, affects them. I.R.C. § 643(f) provides that
two or more trusts will be treated as a single trust for tax reasons if they have
substantially the same grantors30and primary beneficiaries and if tax avoidance is a
principal purpose of the trusts.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made only minor modifications of the throwback
rules. 3i Trust specialists had proposed to legislators and the Treasury Department
that through a compression of the income tax rates for trusts and estates, the tax
incentives for accumulating income could be significantly decreased so that the
throwback rules would not be necessary and could be repealed. 32 However, the final
bill only compressed the rates further than proposed and left intact the throwback
rules. As the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation explained:
The Congress believed that the tax benefits which result from the ability
489 (1977); Zaritsky, The New Accumulation Trust Rules of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 54 TAXES 676,685
(1976).
13See, e.g., General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, supranote 15, at 159-64; Link and Wahoske,
Taxation of Distributionsfrom Accumulation Trusts: The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 52 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 611, 615 (1977); Zaritsky,supra note 22, at 680.
24
See, e.g., Johnston and Garrett, Sweeping Changes in Rules ofAccumulation Trusts partiallyunscramble
tax computations, 4EST. PLAN. 142, 150 (1977).
25Id. at 150.
26
Report of the Committee on Income of Estates and Trusts, 29TAx LAw. 766 (1976).
21Neumark, How to plan trust distributions in light of the elimination of the exact method, 48J. TAX'N 94
(1978).
28 I.R.C. § 667(d) (1978). A full discussion of the application of the throwback tax to foreign trusts is
beyond the scope of this article.
9I.R.C. § 666 (1978).
30For purposes of this section, spouses together are considered as one nerson. IR C' § 64 3 (_) (1986).
31In the 1986 Reform Act, minor technical changes were made to I.R.C. § 665(d)(1) (1986) and I.R.C.
§ 667(b)(2) (1986).
32
See Comfeld,SubchapterJ.Simplification at Last or Through the Looking Glass, 17U. MAMI INsT.ON EsT.
PLAN 1400 (1987).
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to split income between a trust or estate and its beneficiaries should be
eliminated or significantly reduced. On the other hand, the Congress
believed that significant changes in the taxation of trusts and estates are
unnecessary to accomplish this result. Accordingly, the Act attempts to
reduce the benefits arising from the use of trusts and estates by revising
the rate schedule applicable to trusts and estates so that retained income
of the trust or estate will not benefit significantly from a progressive tax
33
rate schedule that might otherwise apply.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 enacted several major changes affecting trusts, such as
the requirements that most trusts use a calendar year and make payments of estimated
tax, that further reduced the tax benefits of a trust entity.34
CURRENT OPERATION OF THE THROWBACK RULES

The description of the peregrinations of the throwback rules described above
does not give an accurate feel for the complexity of the throwback rules. However,
a detailed look at the computation of the throwback tax will demonstrate the
remarkable weave created by the statute and regulations.
Determining Whether A Trust has Accumulated Income
Determining the existence of accumulated income begins with the calculation
of a trust's "distributable net income" (DNI) for a given year.35 DNI is a trust's
taxable income with several adjustments, primarily the removal of (1) the deduction
for distributions to beneficiaries, (2) the capital gains allocated to principal of the
36
trust, (3) the personal exemption allowed a trust, and (4) other adjustments.
Undistributed net income (UNI) exists whenever the DNI of a trust for a given
year exceeds the sum of (1) the distributions of a trust required by the trust instrument
to be distributed currently (tier one distributions),37 (2) the distributions other than
tier one distributions that are properly paid, credited or required to be distributed (tier
two distributions),3 8 and (3) the amount of tax which is attributable to the DNI. 3 9
31 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,

99th Cong. 2d. Sess.,

GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE

TAx

REFORM Acr OF 1986, 1245 (Comm. Print 1987).

31See, e.g., Ferguson, New Law severely restricts ability to use estates and trusts as income-shifting devices,
37 TAx. FOR Accr. 372 (1986).
3'
The thrwback rules can apply to any "preceding taxable year" as defined by the statute. For domestic
trusts, this includes any taxable year beginning after 1968. I.R.C. § 665(eX 1). Separate rules exist for foreign
trusts. I.R.C. § 665(e)(2). Generally, a trust year will not be a preceding taxable year if the trust operates
as a simple trust for the entire year. Treas. Reg. § 1.665(e)- I A(b) (1972).
See I.R.C. § 643 (1986), for a full listing of the adjustments necessary to transform taxable income into
DNI.
37
Tier one distributions are defined in I.R.C. § 661 (a)(1) (1986).
"Tier two distributions are defined in I.R.C. § 661(a)(2) (1986). Roughly speaking, tier one distributions
are distributions that are required under the tust instrument, while tier two distributions are those properly
distributed, but not required to be made.
The "taxes imposed on the trust"
are the federal taxes "properly allocable to the undistributed portions

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/3
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Generally speaking, UNI exists to the extent that DNI exceeds the distributions made
from the trust and the taxes paid by the trust on the DNI.
Distributionof an Accumulation
An accumulation distribution exists when, under the rules, a distribution of
UNI is made. An accumulation distribution occurs when a trust has UNI from prior
years and when the tier two distributions of the trust for a subsequent year exceed the
DNI of the trust's current year reduced by the required tier one distributions." The
amount of the excess is the amount of the accumulation distribution. Roughly
speaking, this occurs when the total required and discretionary trust distributions for
a year exceed the trust's DNI for that year.
When an accumulation distribution is made, the accumulation is deemed to
have been made first from the earliest preceding taxable year in which there is UNI,
moving forward to subsequent years in which the trust has UNI. For purposes of
determining the tax, there is deemed distributed, in addition to the accumulation
distribution, an amount equal to the tax paid on the UNI deemed distributed. If the
accumulation distribution is greater than the UNI for the first year (or the remaining
accumulation distribution is greater than the UNI for any of the next succeeding
years), then the tax deemed distributed is the full amount of the tax imposed on the
trust that is attributable to the UNI.4 1 If, as the accumulation distribution is allocated
to subsequent years, the remaining accumulation distribution is less than the UNI for
a year, then the amount of tax added is the pro rata portion of the taxes attributable
to the UNI for the year.42

Through this method, the accumulation distribution is allocated to the earliest
year in which there is UNI, moving forward to subsequent years. An example should
be helpful.
Example: A trust makes an accumulation distribution in 1985 of
$25,000. For years 1980 through 1983, the trust has the following UNI
and taxes attributable to the UNI:
Year

UNI

1980
1981
1982
1983

$11,252
None
$11,252
$11,252

Taxes Attributable
$3,748
None
$3,748
$3,748

of distributable net income and gains in excess of losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets." I.R.C.
§ 665(d) (1986).
oI.R.C. § 665(b) (1986).
4'I.R.C. §§ 666(a), 666(b) (1986).
42 I.R.C. § 666(c) (1986).
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In the earliest year with UNI, the total accumulation distribution exceeds the
UNI, so the full amount of the taxes attributable to the UNI is added. For 1981, there
is no UNI, so the full remaining $13,748 of accumulation distribution ($25,000 less
the $11,252 of 1980) is carried forward to 1982. Again, the remaining accumulation
distribution exceeds UNI so the full $3,748 of taxes is added. In 1983, the UNI
exceeds the remaining $2,496 of the accumulation distribution, so only a fraction of
the taxes attributable to the UNI is added. This is calculated as $2,496 (remaining
accumulation) divided by $11,252 (the UNI for the year) times $3,748 (the taxes
attributable to UNI), which is $831. Therefore, the amount added to the $25,000
accumulation distribution is the sum of $3748 for 1980, $0 for 1981, $3748 for 1982,
and $831 for 1983, for a total of $33,327. When addition accumulation distributions
are made, they will begin first to pick up the remaining UNI and allocable tax in 1983.
Taxation of the Accumulation Distribution
After determining the total accumulation deemed distribution and years in
which it is deemed distributed, the actual throwback tax can be calculated. First, one
counts the number of "preceding taxable years" in which an accumulation distribution is deemed to have been distributed.4 3 Next, the beneficiary's three "computation years" are identified by taking the beneficiary's taxable income" for the five
years preceding the actual year of the accumulation distribution and removing the
year with the highest taxable income and the lowest taxable income. The total
amount deemed distributed (the accumulation distribution, plus the amount of tax
deemed distributed) is then divided by the number of "preceding taxable years" in
which there is deemed to have been a distribution to arrive at an "average"
distribution. This amount is added to the taxable income of the three computational
years of the beneficiary, and the tax for each year is recomputed. The resulting
increases in the tax due is then averaged to arrive at the average taxable increase.
This average is multiplied by the number of "preceding taxable years," and finally,
this product is reduced by the amount of tax deemed distributed by the trust to arrive
at the throwback tax.
A straightforward example of the throwback computation method is shown in
Table 1 in the Appendix.
AdditionalProvisions
In addition to the foregoing general scheme for the throwback tax, there are
43

A year in which there is UNI will not be counted as a "preceding taxable year" for computational purposes
if the UNI for such year is less than 25% of the amount of the total accumulation distribution divided by the
number of preceding taxable years. I.R.C. § 667(b)(3) (1986). This provision prevents the averaging
mechanism from being skewed intentionally or unintentionally from the presence of one or more years with
a small amount of DNI.
44The beneficiary's taxable income for a prior year includes any prior accumulation distributions to the
beneficiary deemed distributed to that year. I.R.C. § 667(b)(4) (1986).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/3
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several significant provisions that should be noted.
1.

Denial of Refunds or Credits

If the throwback computations result in a negative throwback tax, meaning
that the amount of tax paid by the trust on the UNI was greater than would have been
paid by the beneficiary under the "short-cut" method of calculating the throwback
tax, the beneficiary can receive no benefit from the excess, either as a credit against
additional taxes or as a refund.45
2.

Distribution of Accounting Income of Trust

In some cases, fees and expenses deductible against the principal of a trust
under state law will be taken against income for federal tax purposes. If the trust
distributes its accounting income, as is often required by the trust terms, it may then
have made a distribution in excess of DNI and thus an accumulation distribution (if
the trust has UNI). However, a special rule provides that no accumulation
distribution will be deemed to have occurred so long as the distribution does not
exceed the accounting income of the trust for the year.4
3.

Multiple Trust Rule

If a beneficiary receives accumulation distributions from more than two trusts
which are deemed distributed in the same year, then for the additional trusts, no tax
paid by the trust is deemed distributed, and no credit is allowed to the beneficiary for
47
the tax paid.
4.

Distributions to Minors

The amount of an accumulation distribution shall not include any amount paid
to a beneficiary as income accumulated before the beneficiary reaches the age of 21
or before the beneficiary is born. This exception is not available even for the first
two trusts if the multiple trust rule applies to the beneficiary.48
In addition to these important provisions, there are numerous additional items,
a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article. Some of the areas affected
45I.R.C. § 666(e) (1986).

- I.R.C. § 665(b)(2) (1986).
47I.R.C. § 667(c) (1986). This can result in the double taxation of the accumulation, once by the trust and

a second time when distributed to the beneficiary. This harsh result is ameliorated somewhat by an exception
for any accumulation distribution from a trust of less than $ 1000 and by the fact that if several accumulation
disuibutions are reported by the beneficiary in the same year, the beneficiary can select the order ot those
distributions to minimize the effects of the multiple trust rule. I.R.C. § 667(c)(2) (1986).
Although this rule is aimed at curbing multiple trusts created for tax avoidance, it will apply to three
or more trusts even when created by separate grantors for different purposes.
48I.R.C. § 665(b)(2) (1986).
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49

are the taxation of foreign trusts, the treatment of separate shares established within
the same trust,50 accumulation distributions allocated to multiple beneficiaries, 5' the
effect of other accumulation distributions deemed distributed to the beneficiary in
the same year, 52 and the method for calculating the tax when there are inadequate tax
records.53
RESULTS OF THE THROWBACK TAx AFTER

THE TA REFORM ACT OF 1986
As may be appreciated from the foregoing section, the throwback rules can
add a tremendous complexity to trust administration. The costs of recordkeeping
and reporting any accumulation distributions alone will cause a fiduciary or advisor
to think long and hard before providing for mandatory accumulations in a trust or
before making discretionary accumulations within a trust, even when the non-tax
circumstances argue for this.'
When a full look at the results of the throwback tax is made, it is hard to
understand why Congress failed to eliminate the throwback tax as part of tax reform.
The savings possible from trust accumulations are only a fraction of those possible
in earlier years. In addition, the current throwback rules in some cases may fail to
prevent the tax savings. When one looks at the tax savings that remain after 1986
for a trust accumulating income, the throwback rules appear as heavy artillery
55
indeed.
Table 2 in the Appendix shows the amount of tax savings, without the
operation of the throwback rules, that remains from accumulating income in a trust
for a married couple filing jointly, claiming two personal exemptions, under the tax
rates for 1990.56 (The example of a married couple filing jointly is used because the
rates for this category of taxpayers rise more slowly than for other categories. The
'9 See I.R.C. §§ 665(c), 665(d)(2), 667(d), 668 (1986).
o I.R.C. § 663(c) (1986).
11I.R.C. § 662(a)(2) (1986).
52 I.R.C. § 667(b)(4) (1986).
53I.R.C. § 666(d) (1986).
54
See, e.g., Cornfeld, supra note 32, at 1401; Knickerbocker, SubchapterJ- Throwback Rules, BNA Tax
Management Portfolio 170-4th, A-29 (1988); Johnston and Garrett, supra note 24, at 150.
55
If the throwback rules are repealed, lawmakers may wish to make the change prospective only and maintain
the rules as to income accumulated by trusts prior to the change in rates, in order to recover some of the larger
tax savings from that period. Because the throwback tax is calculated on three of the five preceding year's
income of the beneficiary, it could then be several years before the throwback rules are completely
eliminated. For an example of how the old rates continue to have an impact, see Sallwasser, Throwback Rules
and the New Tax Rates, 20 TAX AnvisER 612 (1989).
56
The 1990 tax rates were announced in Rev. Proc. 90-7, 1990-1 C.B. 432.
The amount of tax savings referred to in the calculations is that arising from a choice of distribution
or accumulation of taxable income. The figures shown do not include the small additional savings from the
personal exemption of a trust. I.R.C. § 642(b) (1986) permits a deduction of $100 for complex trusts,
including accumulation trusts. For purposes of clarity, the effect of the deduction is disregarded.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/3
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wider resulting brackets increase the range of both losses and gains from trust
accumulations.17 )
It is important to understand exactly how tax is lost or saved under the rates.
The savings are dependent on the marginal rates of both the trust and the beneficiary.
First, a trust, as a separate tax entity, may benefit from the run up of the progressive
income tax brackets. Thus, under 1990 rates, a trust may save $709 by having the
first $5,450 of its income taxed at the 15% rate, rather than the 28% which begins
for income above $5,450. If the trust income would have been taxed to the
beneficiary at 15%, nothing is saved because both the trust and beneficiary would
pay the same tax. If the beneficiary would have paid the 28% rate on the trust income
if distributed, $709 is saved. If the trust income would have fallen into the
beneficiary's 33% "phase out" of the advantages of the lower tax brackets and
personal exemptions, $980 would be saved by having the trust pay a 15% rate on the
$5,450 instead of 33% by the beneficiary. The savings then drop back to $709 when
the beneficiary's phase out is complete, and the individual's marginal rate returns to
28%. As shown on Table 2, losses from trust accumulations are possible if the trust
pays tax at a higher rate than the beneficiary.
The tax savings are lost when the trust's income increases and the trust's 15%
bracket is phased out for income between $14,150 and $28,320. However, then the
only significant savings arise as additional trust income continues to be taxed at 28%,
while if distributed may fall in the beneficiary's 33% phase out bracket. This gap
between the trust's 28% marginal rate and the beneficiary's 33% phase out rate
makes possible a maximum tax savings of $5,367. This amount represents 5% (the
beneficiary's 33% marginal rate less the trust's 28% marginal rate) of the entire
phase out range for the beneficiary between income levels of $78,400, when the 33%
bracket begins, and $185,730, when the beneficiary's rate returns to 28%. For each
personal exemption claimed over two, an additional $574 in savings is possible as
another $11,480 of the beneficiary's income could be subjected to the 33% phase out
5
tax. 1
Once the beneficiary's marginal rate returns to 28% and the trust's marginal
and effective rate is 28%, no further tax savings are possible. As shown on Table 2,
when the beneficiary's own income is sufficient to have reached the final 28%
bracket and the trust's effective rate is 28%, there is absolutely no tax savings from
an accumulation.
In summary, under the 1990 rates, the maximum savings from trust accumulations, without consideration of the throwback tax, is $5,367, plus an additional
"For some examples, the results for taxpayers filling jointly are the same as for other categories of taxpayers.
However, the maximum gains or losses for married taxpayers filing jointly will not be exceeded by other
taxpayers.
58The personal exemption for 1990 is increased to $2050. Rev. Proc. 90-7, 1990-1 C.B. 432. This exemption
Published
by$574
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1991which is then phased out through the 33% rate.
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11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 3
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1

$574 for each personal exemption over two claimed by a married couple filing
jointly. Trust planning to take advantage of this opportunity would be possible. A
trust must first have significant income which is subject to an effective tax rate to the
trust of 28%. That trust could then save total taxes, without consideration of the
throwback tax, by accumulating tax so long as the beneficiary's marginal bracket is
33%. However, the extent of the savings would depend on how much of the
beneficiary's 33% bracket is unused, something over which a trustee may have little
planning control.
As a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the tax maximum savings that
would exist without the throwback rules attributableto the basic progressionof the
rates for trusts would be only $908. The only significant savings possible arise not
from the run up of a trust's progressive tax brackets, but from the avoidance of a
beneficiary's phase out 33% bracket.
The tax savings now available are only a fraction of those that could have been
achieved in prior years, when there were greater incentives for trust accumulations.
Table 3 shows the range of tax savings possible for a trust under the 1980 rates. The
maximum saving of $15,448 reflects the amount saved by having the trust incon;
taxed at the brackets below the maximum 70% level for 1980. Therefore, the savings
in 1990 are only a fraction of those possible before, even without taking into account
the real value of prior savings in current dollars. If changes in the Consumer Price
Index are taken into account, the current maximum savings are only a little over a
fifth of those possible in 1980. 5 9 Clearly, the throwback rules are aimed at a much
smaller problem than in the past.
The throwback rules address the potential tax avoidance in a very cumbersome
(as demonstrated above) and inexact way. Although the throwback rules once could
claim the high ground of theoretical purity, upholding the conduit theory of trust
taxation, this is no longer the case. The income is not thrown back to the
beneficiary's year in which it was earned, but instead is averaged over the years of
accumulation and then applied to the medium three of the beneficiary's last five
years of income. The rules do not include an interest factor to address the deferral
of the throwback tax for the period between when the income is earned by the trust
and when it is distributed to the beneficiary. 60 No refund or credit is available if the
throwback calculations yield a negative tax. Finally, the harsh multiple trust rule
exacts a punitive penalty on accumulations distributions from more than two trusts.
The throwback rules fail to guarantee that the tax savings achieved by trust
accumulations will be recaptured. If a beneficiary's own marginal income tax

19Using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers showing a figure of 233.2 for January 1980 and
381.5 for January 1990, the $15,448 savings of 1980 would be worth $25,272 in January 1990. Current Labor
Statistics, 103 Monthly Labor Review, July 1980, 89, 103; 113 Monthly Labor Review, March 1990,71, 103.
60However, an interest charge is made to accumulation distributions from foreign trusts. I.R.C. § 668 (1986).12
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss1/3
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bracket is 33% and a trust's effective tax rate is 28%, the throwback tax can be
reduced or even avoided altogether if the trust accumulates its income for five years,
then distributes its income currently for five years6' and finally makes a distribution
of the accumulated income. Thus, trust income is accumulated and taxed at 28%
when the beneficiary's marginal rate would have been 33% and then distributed in
later years when the beneficiary's marginal tax rate, because of distributions of
current trust income, would be 28%. Because the beneficiary's five preceding tax
years, when additional income, would be taxed at 28%, are used for calculation of
the throwback tax, the accumulation distribution can result in total reduced tax.
Table 4 shows how the throwback tax may fail to result in any tax at all; the
amount of throwback tax avoided is equal to five years of the maximum savings
possible without any throwback tax, demonstrating that the throwback tax, at least
in certain cases, fails to have any effect. It should even be possible to plan for this
result by varying accumulations with distributions in this way for beneficiaries in the
33% bracket, thus achieving total tax savings within the operation of the throwback
rules.
None of this should be taken as an argument that the throwback tax needs to
be amended. The "exact" method of calculating the tax was mandatory until 1969
and an option until 1976 and would prevent this result by throwing back income to
the beneficiary's actual tax year in which it was earned by the trust. However,
experience showed that the burdens of this system were too great. What should be
apparent is that with the new tax rates, the savings from accumulation of income are
no longer as great as in the past and are not substantial enough to justify the
imposition of a contraption such as the throwback rules, especially when for all their
turns and twists, they may fail to have the desired effect of preventing tax savings
from accumulations.
Although the tax savings available to an accumulation trust are not significant,
it might be argued that without the throwback rules these savings can be increased
through the use of multiple trusts. The multiple trust rule in the throwback rules,
I.R.C. § 667(c), prevents this by denying any credit for taxes paid by a subsequent
trust when the beneficiary has already received accumulations distributions from
two other trusts with respect to the year in which the income was earned. 62 However,
this rule is a punitive form of double taxation, and the throwback rules should not be
maintained simply for this purpose.
Instead, reliance should be placed on the general multiple trust rule of I.R.C.
§ 643(f). Under this section, if a grantor or spouse of a grantor creates more than one
61

Actually, because the throwback rules throw out the high and low taxable income years of the beneficiary,
the trust would only need to make current distributions for four years. The earliest of the five years, in which
the beneficiary's marginal rate was still 33%, would be thrown out of the calculations as the low income year.
62 I.R.C. § 667(c) (1986).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 3
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1

trust for substantially the same beneficiaries and tax avoidance is a principal reason
for the trusts, the trusts shall be treated as a single trust for tax purposes. This is a
more refined approach to the problem of multiple trusts. It applies to two trusts,
rather than the "more than two" trusts of the throwback rule, and does not apply, as
the throwback multiple trust rule does, when several trusts are created by unrelated
persons for different purposes which may make distributions to the same beneficiary. 63 Although the multiple trust section of the throwback rules has been criticized
for its inequities, 61 some commentators have argued the reverse, that I.R.C. § 643(f)
is unnecessary because of the existence of I.R.C. § 667(c). 65 However, it is hard to
deny that the general multiple trust rule is a more direct response to the problem of
multiple trusts. If the throwback rules are repealed as suggested here, I.R.C. § 643(f)
can be relied upon to deal with multiple trusts. It should not be necessary to retain
a butcher with a meat cleaver when a surgeon is already present for the operation.
POSSIBLE CHANGES THAT WILL FURTHER

REDUCE THE NEED FOR THROWBACK RULES

As shown above, the amount of tax that can be saved through use of an
accumulation trust, even without the use of the throwback rules, is not substantial,
especially when compared with the potential savings that existed in earlier years.
One would hope that when a fresh look at the issue, free of the almost overwhelming
scope of changes of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, can be taken by legislators and
Treasury officials, they will conclude that we can indeed live without the throwback
rules. If not, and they continue to believe that the onerous throwback rules must be
retained, it is still possible that another fairly simple change will strengthen the
practical argument against throwback rules even more.
One criticism of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 is the resulting "bump" in the
progressive tax rates to the phase out 33% bracket, which then returns to a 28%
bracket. For a country accustomed to more progressive tax brackets, the current
system does not seem sufficiently progressive to many.66 In the spring of 1990,
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rostenkowski included in his plan to
curb the budget deficit a proposal to extend the 33% bracket so that the tax rates do
not drop back to the 28% bracket. 67 The 33% bracket would be a new permanent
63Id. The throwback rule on multiple trusts applies to any three trusts, no matter who the grantors are.
" See supra note 47.
65It is argued that I.R.C. § 643(0 (1986) is less effective because it presents a subjective test of whether tax
avoidance is "a principal purpose" of the trust as opposed to the objective test of I.R.C. § 667(c). Carter,
Section 643(e): A Vague, Subjective Way to Tax Multiple Trusts, 125 TR. AND EST. 36, 37-38 (1986). See
also, Gerhart,Trust andEstateIncome Taxes Changedby TaxReformAct, 124 TR. AND EST. 16, 19-21 (1985).
6 However, there is a debate about whether the overall effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 decreased or
increased the progressivity of the entire tax system. See, e.g., Koppelman, Progressivity Effects of the Tax
Reform Act of1986, 41 NATIONALTAX J. 285 (1988); Marvel, Impact of a twenty-eightpercent tax rateceiling,
36 TAX NOTES 735 (1987).
67Proposal announced on March 12, 1990 as described in Bender's Federal Tax Service, March 15, 1990,
104. See also, Jones, Spotlight on the Rosty Challenge: deficit plan takes hill by storm, 46 TAX NOTES 1351

(1990).
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bracket, rather than just a phase out element.
If this single rate change is made, it will once again significantly reduce the
possible tax savings from trust accumulations. Because the only meaningful savings
from trust accumulations arise, as we have seen, from taxing income in the trust at
28% instead of distributing it to a 33% bracket beneficiary, this rate change would
directly reduce those benefits. Table 5 shows the range of tax savings from such a
change in the rates. The maximum savings under 1990 rates is $1,416, which
represents the savings of having the first $28,320 of trust income taxed at 28% rather
than the 33% that could apply if distributed. At this level of savings, which would
be decreased significantly by the costs of administration for a trust, it cannot
68
seriously be maintained that accumulation trusts will invite tax abuse.
This argument does not rely on the success of Congressman Rostenkowski' s
particular plan; the result of decreasing tax savings from trust accumulations should
be roughly the same for an alternative method in which the "bump" in marginal
rates is removed.
One negative result from a generally applicable extension of the 33% bracket,
or similar plan, is the increased potential losses from trust accumulations. This
increase is seen by comparing the first set of tax savings from Tables 2 and 5. Under
current 1990 rates, a trust accumulating income could pay as much as $4,218 more
than if distributed to a $0 taxable income beneficiary who files a joint return. By
comparison, the losses from trust accumulation if there is an extended 33% bracket
could increase to as much as $6,723.
A closer look at this problem shows that although there is a potential inequity,
it is fairly narrow. First, the ranges shown above are for married couples. In most
cases, a trust earning significant income would distribute under its terms at least a
portion of its income to a married beneficiary who has no taxable income, thus
decreasing the trust loss from accumulation. Therefore, it will be a rare case when
the highest losses shown are actually realized.
The most likely situation in which a trust earning substantial income would not
make a distribution to a beneficiary with little or no taxable income is when the
beneficiary is a minor whose support comes from other sources. In this case, the
narrower brackets of a beneficiary filing as a single taxpayer would decrease the
61 It is unrealistic to think that the throwback rules will receive legislative attention apart from other tax

changes. If this were not the case, one could consider the possible trade off of extending the 33% rate just
for trusts in return for a repeal of the throwback rules. Table 6 shows the range of results for this.
The maximum savings would be $1416, although this could increase another $574 for each
personal exemption over two for a married couple filing jointly. The other change is that the potential losses
from trust accumulation would increase at the higher income levels, as trust income would be subject to the
continued 33% rate rather than be distributed to a 28% beneficiary. This would create an incentive at this
level for distribution of trust income.
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losses from accumulation. As shown in Table 7, the trust losses from accumulation
would then increase only from a maximum of $2,529 to $3,466. Also ameliorating
this problem is the fact that for children up to the age of 14, any trust income
distributed would be taxed under the "kiddie tax rule" at the parent's marginal rate,
which would again usually be higher. 69 The problem of trust tax losses from
accumulations would remain, especially for trusts established for unborn beneficiaries and minors older than 14, who are no longer subject to the kiddie tax, but would
To address this problem, it would appear that
likely not have much taxable income.
7
separate action would be required. 1
CONCLUSION

In a perfect tax system, the choice of accumulating income in a trust would be
a decision based on non-tax reasons. This was not the case in prior years, when
without the throwback rules substantial tax savings could be achieved through trust
accumulations and multiplied through additional trusts. At that time, the throwback
rules, for all the complication they created, were a needed backstop. With the rates
brought by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the potential savings, taking into account
costs of administration, are much smaller and are unlikely to invite accumulation for
primarily tax reasons. Multiplication of these savings can be prevented through use
of I.R.C. § 643(f).
Tremendous simplification of the trust taxation system can safely be achieved
now through outright repeal of the throwback rules, at least for future years. The case
for repeal should be made whenever Congress is engaged in some tinkering with the
overall tax system. If sentiment grows for removing the "bump" in the marginal
income tax rates, a change in the throwback rules can piggyback on that effort and
should present a very strong case for repeal.
The repeal of the throwback rules would not be a major part of any overall tax
reform, but it would restore some simplicity and clarity to an area in need of this. The
repeal would be a move toward allowing decisions about distributions and accumulations to be guided by the grantor's intentions and the beneficiary's needs, rather
than tax savings and fears of entering the continuing labyrinth of the throwback rules.

- I.R.C. § I(i) (1986). The kiddie tax applies to distributions from trusts. Treas. Reg. § 1.1(i)-IT (1987).
70
Although, as discussed above, the problem would not be much worse than now exists, it is still a problem.
It would not be possible to structure a refund or credit for extra taxes paid by trusts, as existed with the original
throwback rules, without retaining some form of the throwback rules. Perhaps an exception to the extended
33% bracket could be carved out for those beneficiaries most likely to be disadvantaged, minors and unborn
beneficiaries. For example, a variation on the terms of a 2503(c) trust could be used to define the group of
trusts which are most likely to result in tax losses from accumulations, and then special provision could be
made for qualifying trusts.
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APPENDIX
The tables contained in the Appendix illustrate the throwback tax mechanisms
and potential savings under certain situations from accumulations of trust income.
For the sake of clarity and simplicity, several assumptions have been made. Trusts
are assumed to have no capital gains or tax-exempt interest. Accounting income is
presumed to be the same as DNI. Except as noted, the 1990 tax rates have been used.
For calculations of projected years, no increase in trust income or personal income
is assumed, and no adjustments in the tax brackets are made as a result of future
inflation. Although in real life these factors would probably not cancel each other
out, keeping both constant minimizes the effects of the presumptions. The $100
exemption available for complex trusts is disregarded as explained in note 56, supra.
Finally, for a handful of figures showing resulting tax, the amount has been rounded
up or down by as much as $1 to coincide with the dollar amount stated in the text
analyzing the source of the savings.
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TABLE 1
EXAMPLE OF THE CALCULATION OF THE
THROWBACK TAX USING 1990 RATES.
Assume married couple filing jointly with two personal exemptions and trust distributing all
accumulated income in year 11.

Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Totals

I
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000
$50,000

Trust

Taxes

UNI

Individual

$14,000
$36,000
$14,000 $36,000
$14,000 $36,000
$14,000 $36,000
$14,000 $36,000
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$70,000 $180,000

Accumulation Distributed
Taxes Deemed Distributed
Total Distribution
Divided by number of "preceding
taxable years"
Average Accumulation
Income Middle 3 of 5 years
Average Accumulation
Total
Tax on Total
Less Tax paid by individual
Increased Tax
Average increased tax
x number of preceding years
Total increased tax
Less Taxes paid by trust
Throwback tax

Income

$78,400
$78,400
$78,400
$78,400
$78,400
$128,400
$128,400
$128,400
$128,400
$128,400

$17,734
$17,734
$17,734
$17,734
$17,734
$34,234
$34,234
$34,234
$34,234
$34,234
$259,840

Combined

Income

$128,400
$128,400
$128,400
$128,400
$128,400
$128,400
$128,400
$128,400
$128,400
$128,400

Taxe
$34,234
$34,234
$34,234
$34,234
$34,234
$34,234
$34,234
$34,234
$34,234
$34,234
$342,340

$180,000
$70,000
$250,000
+5

$50,000
$128,400 $128,400 $128,400
$50,000 $50,000 $50,000
$178,400 $178,400 $178,400
$50,734 $50,734 $50,734
$34,234 $34,234 $34,234
$16,500
$16,500 $16,500
$16,500
x 5
$82,500
$70,000
$12,500

Throwback tax
Taxes Paid
by Beneficiary
Trust
Taxes
paid by

$12,500
$70,000
$259,840

Total Taxes

$342,340

Taxes if all distributed
Savings from trust accumulation

$342,340
$0
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TABLE 2
TAX SAVINGS FROM USING A TRUST UNDER 1990 RATES.
Assuming married couple filing jointly claiming two personal exemptions.

Trust

TrustI

Trust2 Trust3

Trust4 Trust5

Marginal Rate for next $1
Taxable Income
Tax if accumulated

28%
$5,450
$818

33%
$14,150
$3,254

28%
$28,320
$7,930

28%
28%
$50,000 $107,330
$14,000 $30,052

Beneficiaries
Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$0
15%
$0
$5,450
$818
$0

$0
$0
15%
15%
$0
$0
$14,150 $28,320
$2,123
$4,248
($1,131) ($3,682)

$0
$0
15%
15%
$0
$0
$50,000 $107,330
$9,782 $27,280
($4,218) ($2,772)

Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$32,450
28%
$4,868
$37,900
$6,394
$709

$32,450
28%
$4,868
$46,600
$8,830
$709

$32,450 $32,450
28%
28%
$4,868
$4,868
$82,450 $139,780
$19,070 $37,989
$3,070
$203

Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$78,400
33%
$17,734
$83,850
$19,532
$980

$78,400 $78,400 $78,400 $78,400
33%
33%
33%
33%
$17,734 $17,734
$17,734 $17,734
$92,550 $106,720 $128,400 $185,730
$22,403 $27,079 $34,234 $53,152
$2,500
$5,367
$1,416
$1,416

Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991

$32,450
28%
$4,868
$60,770
$12,797
($1)

$185,730 $185,730 $185,730 $185,730 $185,730
28%
28%
28%
28%
28%
$53,152 $53,152 $53,152 $53,152 $53,152
$191,180 $199,880 $214,050 $235,730 $293,060
$54,679 $57,115 $61,082 $67,152 $83,204
$709
$0
$0
$0
$709
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TABLE 3
SAVINGS FROM TRUST ACCUMULATIONS UNDER 1980 RATES.
Assuming married couple filing jointly

Trust 1

Trust2

T1

Trust3

Trust4

Trusts
70%
$107,330
$59,683

Marginal Rate
Taxable Income
TrustTax

21%
$5,450
$954

37%
$14,150
$3,434

49%
$28,320
$9,850

59%
$50,000
$22,002

Beneficiaries
Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax With Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$0
0%
$0
$5,450
$287
($667)

$0
0%
$0
$14,150
$1,877
($1,557)

$0
0%
$0
$28,320
$5,695
($4,155)

$0
$0
0%
0%
$0
$0
$50,000 $107,330
$14,778
$46,323
($7,224) ($11 '360)

Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax With Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$15,000
21%
$2,055
$20,450
$3,343
$334

$15,000
21%
$2,055
$29,150
$5,961
$472

$15,000
21%
$2,055
$43,320
$11,654
($251)

$15,000
21%
$2,055
$65,000
$22,378
($1,679)

$15,000
21%
$2,055
$122,330
$55,819
($5,919)

Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax With Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$45,000
43%
$12,376
$50,450
$14,999
$1,669

$45,000
43%
$12,376
$59,150
$19,262
$3,452

$45,000
43%
$12,376
$73,320
$26,871
$4,645

$45,000
43%
$12,376
$95,000
$39,048
$4,670

$45,000
43%
$12,876
$152,330
$75,019
$2,960

Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax With Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$90,000
59%
$36,098
$95,450
$39,314
$2,262

$90,000
59%
$36,098
$104,150
$44,447
$4,915

$90,000 $90,000
59%
59%
$36,098 $36,098
$118,320 $140,000
$53,253
$67,128
$7,305
$9,028

$90,000
59%
$36,098
$197,330
$105,216
$9,435

$220,000
70%
$120,724
$248,320
$140,548
$9,974

$220,000
70%
$120,724
$327,330
$195,855
$15,448

$220,000 $220,000
Taxable Income w/o Trust
70%
70%
Marginal Rate for Next $1
$120,724 $120,724
Tax w/o Trust
Taxable Income with Trust
$225,450 $234,150
$130,629
$124,539
Tax With Trust Income
$6,471
$2,861
Tax Savings of Trust
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TABLE 4
THROWBACK TAX CALCULATION SHOWING THAT THE THROWBACK
TAX IN CERTAIN CASES CAN BE AVOIDED.*
Assumes a married couple filing jointly claiming two personal exemptions.
Individual

Trust

Year

DNI

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Totals

$107,330
$107,330
$107,330
$107,330
$107,330
$107,330
$107,330
$107,330
$107,330
$107,330

TaM

UI

$77,278
$30,052
$77,278
$30,052
$77,278
$30,052
$77,278
$30,052
$77,278
$30,052
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$150,260 $386,390

Accumulation Distributed
Taxes Deemed Distributed
Total Distribution
Divided by number of "preceding
taxable years"
Average Accumulation

Income
$78,400
$78,400
$78,400
$78,400
$78,400
$185,730
$185,730
$185,730
$185,730
$185,730

Taxes

Combined

Income

$17,734
$17,734
$17,734
$17,734
$17,734
$53,152
$53,152
$53,152
$53,152
$53,152
$354,430

$185,730
$185,730
$185,730
$185,730
$185,730
$185,730
$185,730
$185,730
$185,730
$185,730

$185,730

$185,730

$53,152
$53,152
$53,152
$53,152
$53,152
$53,152
$53,152
$53,152
$53,152
$53,152
$531,520

$386,390
$150,260
$536,650
.5
$107,330

Income Middle 3 of 5 years
Average Accumulation
Total

$185,730
$185,730

$185,730

$135,730

Tax on Total
Less Tax paid by individual
Increased tax

$83,204
$53,152
$30,052

$83,204
$53,152
$30,052

$83,204
$53,152
$30,052

Averaged increased tax on
accumulation
x number of preceding years
Total increased tax
Less Taxes paid by trust
Throwback tax

$30,052
x 5
$150,260
150.260
$0

Throwback tax
Taxes Paid by Trust
Taxes paid by Beneficiary
Total Taxes

$0
$150,260
$354,430
$504,690

Taxes if all distributed
Sings
from t-c

$531,520
-

Taxes

$-

,4

$0

$0

O',)..

$26,830 represents the savings of having the trust amounts taxed at 28% in trust rather than
the 33% for the individual (5 years x 5% x $107,330).
Published
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991
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TABLE 5
SAVINGS FROM USING A TRUST UNDER 1990 RATES, ASSUMING THAT
THE 33% BRACKET IS EXTENDED FOR ALL TAXPAYERS.
Assumes a married couple filing jointly claiming two personal exemptions.

Trust 1 Trust 2

Trust

33%
$14,150
$3,254

Marginal Rate for Next $1
Taxable Income
Tax

28%
$5,450
$818

Beneficiaries
Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust Income
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$0
$0
15%
15%
$0
$0
$5,450 $14,150
$2,123
$818
$0 ($1,131)

Trust 3

Trust 4 Trust5

33%
$28,320
$7,930

33%
33%
$50,000 $107,330
$15,085 $34,003

$0
$0,
$0
15%
15%
15%
$0
$0
$0
$28,320 $50,000 $107,330
$9,782 $27,280
$4,248
($3,682) ($5,303) ($6,723)
$32,450
28%
$4,868
$60,770
$12,797
($1)

$32,450 $32,450
28%
28%
$4,868
$4,868
$82,450 $139,780
$19,070 $37,989
($882)
($883)

Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust Income
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$32,450
28%
$4,868
$37,900
$6,395
$709

$32,450
28%
$4,868
$46,600
$8,831
$709

Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust Income
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$78,400
33%
$17,734
$83,850
$19,532
$980

$78,400 $78,400 $78,400
$78,400
33%
33%
33%
33%
$17,734 $17,734 $17,734
$17,734
$92,550 $106,720 $128,400 $185,730
$22,404 $27,080 $34,235 $53,153
$1,416
$1,416
$1,416
$1,416

Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust Income
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$185,730 $185,730 $185,730 $185,730 $185,730
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
$53,152 $53,152 $53,152 $53,152 $53,152
$191,180 $199,880 $214,050 $235,730 $293,060
$54,950 $57,822 $62,498 $69,653 $88,571
$1,416
$1,416
$1,416
$1,416
$980
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TABLE 6
SAVINGS FROM USING AN ACCUMULATION TRUST UNDER 1990 RATES
ASSUMING THAT 33% IS EXTENDED ONLY FOR TRUSTS.

Trust I
Irust

Trust 2 Trust 3 Trust 4

Trusts5

Marginal Rate for Next $1
Taxable Income
Tax

28%
$5,450
$818

33%
$14,150
$3,254

Beneficiaries
Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust Income
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$0
15%
$0
$5,450
$818
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0
15%
15%
15%
15%
$0
$0
$0
$0
$14,150 $28,320 $50,000 $107,330
$9,782 $27,280
$2,123 $4,248
($1,131) ($3,682) ($5,303) ($6,723)

Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust Income
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$32,450
28%
$4,868
$37,900
$6,395
$709

$32,450 $32,450
28%
28%
$4,868 $4,868
$46,§00 $60,770
$8,831 $12,797
$709
($1)

Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust Income
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$78,400
33%
$17,734
$83,850
$19,532
$980

$78,400 $78,400 $78,400
33%
33%
33%
$17,734 $17,734
$17,734
$92,550 $106,720 $128,400
$22,404 $27,080 $34,235
$1,416
$1,416
$1,416

Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust Income
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$185,730 $185,730 $185,730 $185,730 $185,730
28%
28%
28%
28%
28%
$53,152 $53,152 $53,152 $53,152
$53,152
$191,180 $199,880 $214,050 $235,730 $293,060
$54,679 $57,115 $61,082 $67,152
$83,204
$709
$709
$0 ($1,035) ($3,951)
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33%
$28,320
$7,930

33%
$50,000
$15,085

33%
$107,330
$34,003

$32,450 $32,450
28%
28%
$4,868
$4,868
$82,450 $139,780
$19,070
$37,988
($883)
($883)
$78,400
33%
$17,734
$185,730
$53,153
$1,416
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TABLE 7
LOSSES FROM TRUST ACCUMULATIONS FOR A
TAXPAYER FILING A SINGLE RETURN UNDER 1990 RATES
WITH ONE PERSONAL EXEMPTION.
1. 1990 Rates with Current Tax Brackets

TrustI

Trust2

Trust3 Trust4

Trust5

Marginal rate for Next $1
Taxable Income
Tax if accumulated

15%
$5,450
$818

28%
$14,150
$3,254

33%
28%
28%
$28,320 $50,000 $107,330
$7,930 $14,000 $30,052

Beneficiary
Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust Income
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$0
$0
15%
15%
$0
$0
$5,450 $14,150
$818
$2,123
$0 ($1,131)

$0
$0
$0
15%
15%
15%
$0
$0
$0
$28,320 $50,000 $107,330
$5,401 $11,619 $30,538
($2,529) ($2,381)
$486

2. 1990 rates with 33% bracket extended

Trnst

Marginal rate for Next $1
Taxable Income
Tax if accumulated

15%
$5,450
$818

28%
$14,150
$3,254

33%
28%
28%
$28,320 $50,000 $107,330
$7,930 $15,085 $34,003

Beneficiarl
Taxable Income w/o Trust
Marginal Rate for Next $1
Tax w/o Trust Income
Taxable Income with Trust
Tax with Trust Income
Tax Savings of Trust

$0
$0
15%
15%
$0
$0
$5,450 $14,150
$818
$2,123
$0 ($1,131)

$0
$0
$0
15%
15%
15%
$0
$0
$0
$28,320 $50,000 $107,330
$5,401 $11,619 $30,537
($2,529) ($3,466) ($3,466)
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